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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS






COUNTY OF CARBON; TOM C. GERHARD;
WAYNE E. NOTHSTEIN; CHARLES W. GETZ,
                                                     Appellants
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00049)
District Judge:  The Honorable A. Richard Caputo
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 3, 2003
BEFORE: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  December 31, 2003)
___________
2OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This case arises out of the termination of Robert Yurchak’s employment as
Chief Public Defender for Carbon County.  On January 7, 2002, the Carbon County
Board of Commissioners, which consisted of the individual Appellants, voted to
terminate Yurchak’s employment as Chief Public Defender.  Yurchak subsequently filed
suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Among his claims, Yurchak alleges that the
Appellants are liable to him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for terminating his employment in
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Essentially, Yurchak claims that
the Appellants terminated him because he ran for Judge against a Republican candidate
whom Appellant Gerhard supported.
The Appellants (collectively referred to as “Carbon County”) moved to
dismiss Yurchak’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  The
District Court granted their motion in part and denied it in part.  Particularly relevant to
this appeal, the District Court denied Carbon County’s motion to dismiss based on
qualified immunity.  Carbon County now appeals the District Court’s order with respect
to qualified immunity.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.  Emerson
3v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will affirm the order of the District
Court.
This appeal is limited to the issue of whether the District Court properly
denied Carbon County’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.  The standard
for establishing the defense of qualified immunity is that “government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982).  The most difficult issue in most qualified immunity cases, the present
case included, is determining whether the right asserted was “clearly established.”  In
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), the Supreme Court held that, while the
specific official action at issue need not have been previously held unlawful, the
unlawfulness of that action must be apparent in light of pre-existing law.  This Court has
summarized the “clearly established” rights standard as insulating an official from
liability “so long as his actions are objectively reasonable under current federal law.” 
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 299 (3d Cir. 2000).  
Applying this standard, the District Court denied Carbon County’s motion
to dismiss based on qualified immunity because it determined that “[a]ssuming that
Plaintiff’s allegations can be proven, ‘the contours of current law [at the time of the
alleged conduct would have] put a reasonable defendant on notice that his conduct would
1. We reference the page of the District Court opinion because the first volume
of the submitted record is not separately paginated.
2. Yurchak alleges that, “in no way is the political affiliation of a public defender
relevant to the performance of the job [of Chief Public Defender].” (A.R., 11.)  Taking
this allegation as true, Branti illustrates that Carbon County was violating clearly
established law when it terminated Yurchak.  However, because we are reviewing a
motion to dismiss, we express no opinion as to whether Carbon County would be able to
present a set of facts sufficient to refute Yurchak’s allegations, distinguish the Carbon
County Chief Public Defender position from the position at issue in Branti and show that
its actions were not in violation of “clearly established” law.
4
infringe on the plaintiff’s asserted right.’” (Dist. Ct. Op., 6-7)1(citing Gruenke, 225 F.3d
at 302).  The District Court came to this conclusion because the Supreme Court decided
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519 (1980) “more than twenty (20) years before the
conduct in question.” (Dist. Ct. Op., 6).  The District Court concluded that Branti stood
for the proposition that the independent nature of a public defenders office meant that
political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement for the position of Chief Public
Defender.  (Id., 5).  Therefore, according to the District Court, taking Yurchak’s
allegations as true, Carbon County could not terminate his employment based on his
political affiliation.  
We agree with the District Court that, taking Yurchak’s allegations as true,
Branti clearly establishes that the Chief Public Defender position for Carbon County was
not a position where political affiliation is an appropriate requirement.2 Therefore, Carbon
County’s termination of Yurchak’s employment because of his political affiliation was in
violation of clearly established law and that action is not entitled to qualified immunity.
5For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of
Carbon County’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.
6_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Richard L. Nygaard
________________________________
Circuit Judge

